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 With the vast media coverage of the events in both Ferguson and New York, 
grand juries have been brought back to the forefront of the public eye. In Ferguson a 
young man by the name of Michael Brown was shot by a police officer, leading to a 
grand jury refusing to indict the police officer for criminal charges (McClam, 2014). 
In New York the police killed a man named Eric Garner and the grand jury there 
refused to indict that officer as well (Chandler, 2014). The debate has begun to gain 
momentum of whether grand juries are still performing the function that they were 
designed to do (Washburn, 2008). Criticisms from many claim that the grand juries 
are no longer doing their job, with some even calling for the complete abolishment 
of the system altogether (Doria, 1997). Originally these grand juries were created to 
protect the people from an oppressive government, creating what came to be known 
as the “shield” function, as well as being able to indict those who had committed 
crimes, which was thus named the “sword” function (Washburn, 2008). Many fear 
that grand juries have begun to depend too much on the prosecution, meaning they 
have lost their “shield” function by no longer protecting the public from unfounded 
criminal claims (Fouts, 2004). While some claim the system is beyond repair, it is 
the belief of others that grand juries can be reformed to do what they were created 
to do (Doria, 1997). This essay will explore the history behind grand juries, the 
criticisms against them, and reforms that have been suggested to fix the problematic 
grand jury system.  
History of Grand Juries 
 Before it can be determined if grand juries have deviated from their original 
function, it must first be determined what that original function and purpose was. 
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Like many of the laws and customs that are followed in the United States today, 
grand juries came from England with the original east coast colonists (Washburn, 
2008). Grand juries in England were seen as a great part of the judicial process 
because they would refuse to issue indictments, showing that they were 
independent from any governmental pressure (Washburn, 2008). This purpose was 
carried over to the colonies where grand juries were also used as investigative 
bodies, since the police force was vastly underdeveloped and underfunded 
(Washburn, 2008). Some states and nations did not have a sanctioned police force, 
while others had groups that were composed of volunteers who did the best they 
could with little means of ways to enforce the law (Washburn, 2008). Grand juries 
were able to fill the investigative gap that the police force at the time could not. This 
is how the “sword” function of grand juries was developed. Grand juries could take it 
upon themselves to investigate legal issues, which could lead to justice for those that 
were wronged (Washburn, 2008). Colonists saw these grand juries as a way to stand 
up to the Crown, as well as any other governmental oppression, leading to them 
being included in the justice system of the new United States and its Constitution in 
the Fifth Amendment as well (Washburn, 2008).  This is also where the “shield” 
function of grand juries was developed. Citizens were protected from unwarranted 
prosecutions as grand juries refused to issue indictments based on political and 
governmental pressures (Washburn, 2008). In one case a grand jury refused to issue 
an indictment when it was asked for because the English Crown was not pleased 
with the man, showing that grand juries could serve as a “shield” to protect citizens 
from the government (Washburn, 2008).  Based on their popularity, grand juries 
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were included in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, requiring a grand jury 
indictment before a person could be prosecuted for the felony (Washburn, 2008). 
From these original functions, many claim grand juries have changed drastically.  
 Today grand juries are charged with the duty of determining if there is 
probable cause that a person committed a specific felony (Fouts, 2004). If they find 
this to be true, then they are allowed to issue an indictment and charges can be filed 
against that person (Fouts, 2004). In order to determine this probable cause, grand 
juries listen to evidence and witnesses presented by the prosecutor (Fouts, 2004). 
While this is much like the function of a trial jury, grand juries do not determine 
guilt, hear any defense theories or theories of innocence, or publish what occurs 
within the hearings (Fouts, 2004).  Grand juries do not need a unanimous vote in 
order to issue and indictment; in some cases they only need to have a small majority 
(Fouts, 2004). Grand juries are also given the option issuing a “no bill,” or not 
issuing charges (Hoffmeister, 2008). Based on this “no bill,” the individual will not 
be charged in the federal court system; if this occurs in the state court system a 
prosecutor may have other options in order to press charges instead (Hoffmeister, 
2008).    
Criticisms of Grand Juries 
Prosecutorial Dependence  
One of the most common criticisms of grand juries is that they have become 
too dependent on prosecutors (Beall, 1998). Instead of looking at the evidence 
presented to them, grand juries are simply issuing the indictment that the 
prosecutor asks them to (Beall, 1998). No longer are grand juries serving in their 
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“shield” function, but instead have become a tool of the prosecutor. Originally 
prosecutors were not always present at grand jury hearings, but by the twentieth 
century it was quite common (Fouts, 2004). Control of grand jury proceedings is 
constantly left to the prosecutor and their discretion. Only if the jurors themselves 
decide to take some control do prosecutors take a slightly less influential role.  
Prosecutors in theory should remain neutral and give correct and unbiased legal 
advice to the jurors, but this often is not the reality (Hoffmeister, 2008). The order 
in which evidence is presented, how witness are questioned, and what subpoenas 
are to be issued are all largely under the control of the prosecutor (Hoffmeister, 
2008). Unless grand juries realize they have more power than they are often 
informed of, the prosecutor controls much of what the grand jury does. Grand juries 
that do realize and use their powers to the fullest extent are labeled as “runaway” 
and seen as not doing their job properly (Hoffmeister, 2008). Since the prosecutor is 
customarily the only actor in grand jury hearings with a legal background, jurors 
quite often listen to the advice that is given. Based on these facts a grand jury is 
more likely than not to issue an indictment, becoming a “rubber stamp” for the 
prosecution instead of serving as a separate body (Fouts, 2004).   
What is largely unknown is the fact that grand juries do have the option to 
not issue an indictment, even if they believe probable cause is evident (Hoffmeister, 
2008). In the creation of the grand jury system, one of the foundations was that a 
grand jury could protect a citizen from the government even if the government had 
evidence against them (Fouts, 2004). This was ultimately assured by a case in which 
the Supreme Court stated that “the grand jury is not bound to indict in every case 
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where a conviction can be obtained” (Vasquez v. Hillery, 1986, quoting United States 
v. Ciambrone, 1979, p. 14). This ultimately allows a grand jury to become a voice for 
the citizens and no longer a pawn of the prosecutor, if properly used today. 
What was known as the “community voice” has also been lost as grand juries 
have strayed away from their original design and function (Fairfax, 2010). Grand 
juries are composed of members of the community, making them an avenue for 
public opinion to be heard (Beall, 1998). The grand juries of London in the 1600s 
stood up to the crown, showing that the community did not believe in certain 
potential charges, so they would refuse to issue indictments, creating a “shield” for 
the citizens from the government (Washburn, 2008). The jurors showed that if a 
community did not believe in certain government actions, that the community could 
stand up and say, through the voice of the grand jury, that they would not support 
the government in those particular actions. Since democratic governments depend 
on their power from the people, they often have to follow the will of those people in 
order to stay in power. Grand juries were designed as a way for the community to 
have input on criminal matters, as well as keeping the interests of the community as 
a whole in mind in making decisions of what indictments to issue (Washburn, 
2008). By performing this function, prosecutors would be kept in check and 
communities would be more likely to support the criminal justice system since they 
were a more utilized part of it (Washburn, 2008). It can be argued that with a strong 
community voice, through the use of grand juries, governmental policies and actions 
could be impacted (Beall, 1998). Just as trial juries provide a community voice, 
grand juries can do the same, but often fail to in today’s world. 
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The importance of grand jury independence from the prosecutor becomes 
even more necessary when a prosecutor refuses to follow the suggestions of the 
grand jury (Beall, 1998). In the case of one grand jury the issue was not about an 
indictment, but the fact that a prosecutor took a plea bargain over filing charges 
against a corporation. In 1989, a grand jury was called to investigate Rocky Flats 
Nuclear Weapons Plant for environmental crimes, including failure to properly 
dispose of nuclear waste (Beall, 1998). Over the course of two years the grand jury 
listened to testimony from witnesses and poured over countless boxes of evidence, 
eventually determining that there was enough to issue an indictment not only for 
employees of the plant, but also for members of the Department of Energy as well 
(Beall, 1998). Instead of filing these charges, the prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain 
before charging, causing outrage among members of the grand jury (Beall, 1998). 
These members felt that the public voice was being ignored and that the 
prosecution was not doing its duty. The grand jury had been used, and then ignored, 
when the prosecutor did not get the wanted results. These members felt they had 
been cheated (Beall, 1998). 
Conflicting Roles 
The debate of the judicial role of grand juries is also been brought to the front 
as many have argued that they depend on prosecutors but play a judicial role as well 
(Kuckes, 2006). Based on the Constitution and the separation of powers that is 
created within it, grand juries should not have both prosecutorial and judicial roles, 
as this would stop the separation of powers and weaken the checks and balances 
system (Kuckes, 2006). These two very different roles clash, causing a large conflict 
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on what role is best. Some see the role of indictment as prosecutorial, but others 
argue it is judicial. Grand juries are often describes as inquisitorial in nature, 
meaning they investigate both sides of the issue and determines a decision from that 
(Kuckes, 2006).  This lends to a judicial function in which the grand jury is doing 
what is just and fair for both sides, yet the act of issuing an indictment is seen as 
prosecutorial (Kuckes, 2006). This is where a grand jury can also be twisted to favor 
the prosecution. Since the prosecution is the only side to present evidence to a 
grand jury, both sides are not heard meaning the matter may not be fully 
investigated (Kuckes, 2006). Thus the grand jury loses part of its judicial function 
and becomes more prosecutorial in nature.  
Loss of Due Process Rights 
 In a trial court victims and the accused are all given certain due process 
rights protected by the Constitution and other legal decisions (Christofferson, 
1998). This is done to protect these individuals from an unfamiliar and complicated 
legal process. In grand juries these rights are not given (Christofferson, 1998). One 
such trial protection is that a prosecutor must disclose any exculpatory evidence, 
meaning evidence that could prove innocence (Christofferson, 1998). This is not 
required in grand jury proceedings (Christofferson, 1998). The Supreme Court also 
stated this in the case of United States v. Williams (1992). While some states, such as 
California, have adopted policies for exculpatory evidence to be provided, federal 
grand juries are not governed by those policies (Christofferson, 1998). Policies, like 
those in California, do little to explain exactly what evidence qualifies as 
exculpatory, creating even greater confusion. (Christofferson, 1998). Based on this 
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issue, individuals could face an indictment for a crime that the prosecutor had 
evidence showing they did not commit.  
 Witnesses in grand jury proceedings also have little to no rights. They are not 
allowed to have legal counsel and are also forced to testify against their will (Decker, 
2005). Miranda warnings are not required to be stated to witnesses (Decker, 2005). 
The right to not self-incriminate is not always told to witnesses, even if the witness 
could face criminal charges based on their statements (Decker, 2005). All of these 
legal policies have been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, based largely on the fact 
that grand jury hearings are not seen to be as coercive as police interrogations 
(Decker, 2005).  Any person can be called as a witness to a grand jury through a 
subpoena, even if that person is not considered a target of the proceedings (Decker, 
2005). When authorizing subpoenas, grand juries do not have to meet any standard 
of proof that a witness is involved or could be helpful, but must simply just file the 
subpoena to obtain an individual as a witness (Decker, 2005). Witnesses enter the 
grand jury system with little to no knowledge of what is happening, causing some to 
face legal consequences for their statements.  
 Grand juries also possess the power to issue subpoenas for any and all kinds 
of information, in addition to witness testimony. While they often follow the 
prosecutor’s lead on what and whom to issue subpoenas for, they can also do this on 
their own.  While police officers and other investigators must provide probable 
cause to be given a subpoena, grand juries do not have to meet this threshold 
(Decker, 2005). Instead grand juries can subpoena large amounts of evidence based 
on just a gut feeling (Decker, 2005). With basically no justification, a grand jury can 
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access private records, with little to no notice to the individual that they will be 
seizing those records (Taslitz & Henderson, 2014). Through this grand juries can 
often investigate matters that other criminal justice professionals cannot, but at the 
cost of the due process rights of the people (Taslitz & Henderson, 2014). Again it can 
be seen that individuals do not have the rights and protections that they normally 
have in other criminal justice proceedings, even though grand juries are considered 
to be a part of the process.  
Changes from Original Function 
 As grand juries have developed and changed, they have also split into two 
different categories: those at the state level and those at the federal level because of 
a divide that was created at the start of the United States. When grand juries were 
officially created through the Constitution, they were only mandated for federal 
issues, even though they had been used by the state governments before the 
ratification of the Constitution (Washburn, 2008). Even after the passing of the 14th 
Amendment, the use of the selective incorporation doctrine failed to result in the 
incorporation of the requirement of a grand jury proceeding mandated in the Fifth 
Amendment, to the states (Decker, 2005). This was held by the court in the case of 
Hurtado v. California (1884) when it was decided that the grand jury process is only 
required at the federal level. This has ultimately created a wave of issues.  
Some states that have grand juries, such as California, have created a rule 
stating that a prosecutor must provide exculpatory evidence to a grand jury, while 
other states have not (Christofferson, 1998). Confusion has arisen since each state 
has different rules from each other and from the federal grand jury system 
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(Christofferson, 1998). Some states have also elected to not have a grand jury 
system at all, meaning citizens of those states do not have the opportunity to have a 
community review before they are indicted (Christofferson, 1998).  All of these 
differences between the federal and states grand jury systems have created a large 
amount of confusion.  
 Based on these major criticisms, reforms of the grand jury system have been 
suggested. Some feel the whole system should be done away with, but many feel it 
can be saved and made better than before if changes are made.  
Reform Options  
Independence from Prosecutors 
 One of the most supported reforms is that of making grand juries 
independent from prosecutors (Beall, 1998). By doing this the “shield” function 
would be restored to its former power and grand juries would be able to make their 
decisions without the influence of a prosecutor (Washburn, 2008). One such way of 
doing this is to give grand juries the power to issue an indictment without the 
permission of the prosecutor and have that indictment be carried out in court (Beall, 
1998). Currently a grand jury can issue an indictment, but a prosecutor can refuse to 
sign it, meaning charges will never actually be brought (Beall, 1998). Through this 
the voice of the community is lost, and a grand jury can be rendered as useless 
(Washburn, 2008). Instead the grand jury should be allowed to hold the prosecutor 
accountable and be able to force charges to be brought (Beall, 1998).  
 Along with forcing a prosecutor to press charges, grand juries should also be 
always informed of their right to not authorize an indictment. Ultimately this is 
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known as jury nullification, but on many occasions prosecutors choose to not inform 
a grand jury of that option (Fouts, 2004). Instead, grand juries are often led by the 
prosecutor to believe that an indictment is the only option based on the evidence 
that is presented to them (Fouts, 2004). Without a strong nullification power grand 
juries lose their ability to protect the public from unnecessary prosecution. They 
eventually become just an extra and unneeded step in the criminal justice process. 
By reaffirming their nullification power, grand juries would be returned to their 
original high status of being protectors of the public.  
 Another way to gain independence from the prosecutor is that grand juries 
be provided with a Grand Jury Legal Advisor. While this is not a completely new 
concept, it is one that has not be used on a consistent basis (Hoffmeister, 2008). This 
counsel would provide a grand jury with unbiased legal advice (Hoffmeister, 2008). 
Also, this counsel could provide a grand jury with the information of exactly what 
they are allowed to do and what powers they can exercise (Fouts, 2004). Even just 
the presence of another legal actor could force the prosecutor to keep proceedings 
fair instead of just presenting arguments for their side of the case (Hoffmeister, 
2008). By doing this, grand jury proceedings would become fair to both sides 
instead of being so one-sided in favor of the prosecution.  
Additional Powers 
 Not only could grand juries gain independence from prosecutors, they could 
also be given additional powers as well. Plea bargaining has proven to be the most 
common form of solving criminal matters, with many individuals pleading guilty 
before a grand jury even decides if an indictment is allowable (Fairfax, 2010). These 
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individuals feel that the criminal justice system is too slow, so they would rather just 
admit to the crime than wait. It has been proposed that grand juries should be used 
to screen plea bargains before they can be accepted so that the plea bargains are fair 
to all the parties involved and that the judge is not taking advantage of the 
individual (Fairfax, 2010). The same could also be applied to sentencing. While this 
would limit a judge’s power, it would increase the voice of the community and could 
prevent innocent individuals from pleading guilty and spending time incarcerated 
(Fairfax, 2010). Overall this would put an individual’s fate in the hands of a jury at 
all points in the criminal process.  
Special Grand Juries 
 Most grand juries are developed to review fairly straightforward criminal 
cases, but special grand juries can be created to investigate more complex issues, 
such as organized crime (Decker, 2005). These grand juries often are much more 
investigative in nature than their counterparts (Decker, 2005). In order to further 
increase the grand jury’s power to check the government, it has been proposed that 
special grand juries be created to investigate public officials at both the federal and 
state levels (Buchwald, 2007). These special grand juries would be allowed to 
release their findings so the public would be aware of what their government was 
doing (Buchwald, 2007). Although some grand juries have been allowed to do this, if 
all were allowed to it would give them more power to keep governmental officials in 
line. An example of this could be found in the Watergate Scandal; the public wanted 
to know what happened and a special grand jury would be able to find that out 
(Buchwald, 2007).  In California this reform has already taken place. Grand juries 
 14 
serve as “watchdogs” and investigate the wrongdoing of public officials and local 
governments (Doria, 1997). This helps to ensure that elected officials are following 
the laws and doing what their constituents want them to do.  
 Another form of special grand juries that has been suggested at the state 
level is one that is even a more community based form. Grand juries would be in 
charge of smaller areas, making it more likely that the members would come from 
the same community ( Washburn, 2008). This would in theory increase the chance 
that they would all have similar opinions on the same issue. This would increase 
their voice as a community and make it more unified (Washburn, 2008). Through 
this grand juries could further influence policies because of their members’ unified 
voice. 
Juror Training 
 A constant criticism of the grand jury system is that the jurors lack legal 
knowledge, so they cannot decide if there is enough evidence for an indictment. One 
counter argument to this is that trial or petit jurors do not receive any formal 
training either (Hoffmeister, 2008). Those jurors decide if  a person will face 
penalties for their actions, which is much more impactful on an individual than the 
decision that they might have committed the crime but they may not have either.  So 
it could be said that if any jurors should be provided with training, that it should be 
those of trial juries (Hoffmeister, 2008). 
 The other response to this argument, is to provide grand jurors with training 
to ensure they know all their options and what they are suppose to do. Jurors would 
not have the legal knowledge of those in the legal field, but they would be given 
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basic training on how to handle information and how to properly ask questions 
(Doria, 1997). Based on this training they would not have to depend so much on the 
prosecutor for information and could question witnesses themselves (Doria, 1997). 
This training would also inform jurors of all their options, such as they can refuse to 
issue an indictment if they feel the need (Fouts, 2004). All of this training could take 
several days but it would ensure that the grand jury process is fair to everyone 
involved.  
Conclusion 
 Countless criticisms and reforms have been offered in regards to the current 
grand jury system. Some individuals claim the system is beyond repair, while others 
say there is hope if changes are made. It has been made clear that while the system 
may no longer be functioning how it use to, it is still a vital part to the criminal 
justice system. It is hoped that by reforming the system that grand juries will again 
serve as both the “sword” and the “shield” and do what they were designed to do.  
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